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1．IntrOdu6tiOn
　　　　The　US－Japan　relationship　has　1ong　been　the　most　important
dip1o㎜atic　reiationship　for　the　Japanese　govemmen■　Of　course，secu－
rity　and　defense　issues　are　i：mportant　in　this　re1ationship，esPecia11y
w・hen　the　figh」t　against　terrorism　continues．However，an　eConomic
reIationship　has　also　been　playing　a　m早jor　role　because　the　United
States　is　sti11the　largest　trading　partner　for　Japan，United　States　and
Japal：l　share　aユong　history　of　tr乞de　negotiations　since　ユ50years　ago
’w」hen　the　first　US－Japan　trade　treaty　was　sig口ed．
　　　　In　this　paper，I　will　discuss　the　US－Japan　negotiation　over　an
econo㎜ic　issue，I　take　up　especially　theユ995’s　negotiatio］ユbetween　the
USTR（United　States　Trade　Representative）狐d　the　M」ITI（：Ministry　of
Intemationa1Trade　and　Industry　of　Japan）20ver　automobile　trade
！U」nfo・tu抑atelyヨ此・o脈・se卿y皿otb⑪ldtme，
2　’Even　tho口gh　MITI　is几ow遣al一筍d　Mlinist㎎一〇f　E・cono皿y呈Trade抑d　hdus虻y，I　wl11
　エ皿。aint劃irユthe　us婁ge　⑪f㎜丁工ぬ　t虹is　paper　becaU§e　the　age皿套y　was　Oユe皿　ca三1ed　MIT工
wh靱the鵬9⑪雌i◎皿tooヒ幽ce，
5ユ
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issues，I猟il1first　describe　the　historical　background　of　this　negotia－
tionI　Then，I　wi111ook　at　the　process　of　the　autcmobile　negotiation　a1ong
珊h．ich　I　wi1I　contrast　this　negotiation　with　past　negotiations　because　in
this　1995　autc　case，it　h．as　been　said　that　Japan　side　took．stronger
stance　thall　before．I　wi11　analyze　the　reasons　behind　this　change　of
Tapanese　negotiators　by　looking　at　changes　in　their　BATNA　（Best
AIternati▽e　To　a　Negotiated　Agreement），3their　organizational　structure，
and　other　issues．工wiu　a1so　analyze　the　reasons　why　US　fai1ed　to　reach
a勉vorable　agree皿ent　with　Japan　this　time、」Fim1ly，l　will　expiain　what
makes　this　kin．d　of　economic　negotiations　difficult，
　　　　In　1995　auto　negotiation，a1though　both　sides　fina1ly　came　to　a
conc1usion，主he　outcome　of　the　trade　negotiation　is　considered　as　a
failure．4　It　was　not　an　agree皿ent　at　a1L　As　the　Japanese　press　Put　it，
the　outco㎜e」w’as　seen　as獺the　color　of　Tamamushi（the　name　of　insects
whose　color　is　very　complex　and　cannot　easi1y　be　determined）”一so
aInbiguous　that　it　can　be　interpreted　in　many　（different）ways，5
Probably　in　order　to　sa▽e　negotiators’　faces　and　to　al1eviate　the
constituents’dissatisfaction，US　domestic　news　on　the　ccnsequence　of
the　negotiation　and　that　of　Japan　did　not　coincide　at　all，6Whi1e　US
side　reported　they　agreed　with　Tapan　on　numerica1target，Japan　side
c1aimed　that　it　never　reached　such　an　unreasonab1e　agreement．Their
conclusion　was　not　an　agreement，but　was　just　a　docume正it　which　cou1d
3　BATNA　is　mtroduced　m　p．ユ00of　the　book’’Getting　t⑪YES｝by　Fisher　md」Ury
（1991）．
4　Bhagwati　with　Sakamoto、“Taidalユ（Talks）一a止out　Japan－US　aljto　negotiatlonも¶
　Tsuus盆Ii（I血ternational　Trade　and　Industry〕Journal．December，1995，p．！0．
5　Kitaoka．Shm－1cl〕i．ムNichil〕ei－ka皿keishi　no　Shit虐血一kara（Fronl　the　vlew　point　of　the
history　of　US－Japan　reIatlo口s）．”Tsu1ユs加JournaI，December，1995，pp．14一ユ5．
6　By　reading　the　newsp盆pers　in　two　countries，1was　convinced　on　this－Th竃
newspapers　referred　are　Nihon－Keizal　Shi－Iibu血，New　Yo1－k　Times，and　Financial
Times　in　June1995、
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be　interpreted　in　two　differe口t　ways－But　if　we　look　at　the　final　draft，it
is　obvious　that　US　side　gave　inI7　American　economist，Professor
Bhagwati　of　Colum」bia　University，asserted　that　the　fina1docuエnent　of
agreement　is　rather　disadvantageous　to　the　United　States　while，most　of
the　A㎜erican　public　be1ieved　that　the　negotiation　was　successful
because　most　of　the　public　blind1y　believed　what　Kantor　said，8Why
did　US　negotiators　fail　this　negotiation？
　　　　My　analysis　clai㎜s　th」e　reasons　of　failure　as　follows．There　are
four　reasons　why　US　side　fai1ed　to　reach　a1皿utual　consistent　ag－
reement：1）U」S　stuck　with　the　positional　negotiation，2）US　failed　to
recognize　the　change　in　Japan’s　increased　negotiating　power，which
came　from　the　shift　in　Japan’s　BATNA，3）’US　failed　to　recog皿ize　the
cha口9e　in　the　internal　organ三zational　structural　change　in　JaPan，and4）
US　’negotiators　aIways　viewed　JaPanese　negotiators　in　stereotyped
im」age，
　　　　I　wi11not　c1aim　that　Japan“succeeded’’in　this　negotiation．It　was
not　a“success．”It　w」as　just　that　JaPanese　negotiators　did　not　give　in
their　interests　for　the　sake　of皿aintenance　of　the　US－Japan　re1ation－
ship－I　claim　that　the　negotiation　was　a　fai1ure・皿ost1y　because　of　US
side’s　misguided　strategy，Negotiation　is　not　a　zero－su皿game，There
aren’t　always　winners　and　losers－Ideally，if　a　negotiation　succeeded，
both　sides　win．Successful　negotiaticn　is　m」cre　difficu1t　than　fai1ure．
W」hy」？Bec如se　it　takes　tw」o，both　sides享to迦ake　it　su㏄essful，but　it
七ak」e§　on」ly　one　to　1皿ake　it　a　failu」re，In　this　case，t血e　United　States
Trade　R」eprese工1tatjve　was　the“9ne，顯
　　　　Here　ls　a工1　exce11ent　episode　・珊一hich　sbows　the　validity　of　nユy
argument－It　took　place　in　Geneva　right　after　the　said“agreemen」t”o1〕
Jun」e28，ユ995、
7Thep⑪i皿t・榊smadebパita⑪ka（1995），ibid．P．ユ4，
8’Bhagw・tlwjthS・kam．to（！995），ibid，P昔10。
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　　Mr．Sakamoto，Tsu－san　Shingikan（MITI　negotiating　chair，Vice
　　Minister　for　Internationa1Affairs），responded　the　question　from
　　the　Japanese　press＝“We　lUSTR　and　Mm】agreed　that　we　won’t
　　agree．”A　question　fol1owed　from　the　press，“Did　Japan　side　win　in
　　the　negotiation？”Mr．Sakamoto　posed　a　litt1e　to　think　about　the
　　question　and　then　ga▽e　an　answer：“To　say　the　least，we　did　not
　　1ose、”which　made　press　peop1e1augh．9
　　　　Mr．Sakamoto’s　response　inc1udes　the　points　I　made　earlier．The
negotiation　was　de　facto　failure　because　it　was　not“an　agreemenピ’It　is
not　that　Japan　won，but　that　MITI　did　not　give　in．
　　　　Before　getting　into　the　detailed　analysis　on　the　reasons　of　fai1ure
in1995US－Japan　automobi1e　negotiation，it　is　worthwhile　to1ook　at　the
background　information，especial1y　a　historica1one。
2．lBack駅ound　and　Histo町
　　　　The　automobi1e　negotiation　is　one　of　the　major　topics　in　long－
1asting　US＿Japan　trade　negotiations．These　trade　negotiations　inc1ude
textiles，stee1，TV　sets，VCRs，machinery，semiconductors，and　automo－
bi1es　and　auto　parts．ユo　US－Japan　trade　negotiation　has　been　going　for
more　than　thirty　years．ユ1　Among　these，automobile　trade　has　been
a1ways　a　primary　issue　because　of　the　strength　of　US1abor　union
（UAW）and　the　size　of　its　trade．
9　Ishii，Hayato（Kyodo：Press皿ember）、曲Goui　HapPyou　mo　Ko11sho1』no　Ichibubun－
Mouretsl1datta　America　Gawa　m　Houdou　Senryaku（Amounce　of　agreement　as　a　part
of　the　negotiation　」　Very　Strong　A血erlcan　Press　Strategy）．”Tsuusan　Journa1．
　February，1996，pp．22－23．
10　MIT1，Tsusho－hakusho（White　Paper　on　Inモematio皿al　Trade）．1989．
1ユ　Itoh，Motoshige，Zemi肋一m　Kokusai　Keizai　Nyuumon（Seminar1工ntroduction　to
　lnternati011al　EcoIlomios）、Tokyo：Nihonkeizai　Shimbun　Sha，1989．p．247．
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2－A，The　history①f　au」ω。I口①Hle　nego句a加on
　　　　Automobile　issue　became　on－e　of　the皿ain　trade　issues　i．n　ear1y
1980s，and　it　continues　to　be　a　pri・nlary　issue　for　more　than15years，12
At　first，∫apan　gave　in　easily　to　the　strong　US　position　by　restricting
the　number　of　Japanese　cars　imported　to　US，（This　is　called　a　VER，or
vo1untary　export　restraint、）Then，Japanese　automゴkers　shifted　their
strategy　from　direct　export　to　the　combinatユon　of　export　and　transplant
production，and　supp1ied　US　market　with　the　co1〕／bination　of　low－price
tエansp1ant　products　and　high＿priced　luxury　imported－products　using
the　brand　na皿es　such　as　Lexus（Toyota），Infiniti（Nissan），and　Acura
（Honda）。Because　of　i皿creased　transpIa皿t　productioP，the　auto　parts　trade
irユcreased　from　Japan一．A」1§o，despite　of　qu如titative　restriction　on　tbe　auto一
皿obi1e　trade　itse1f，㎜」onetary　value　of　US　Auto皿obile　i皿port　fr◎m　J到pan
d．id　n◎t　dec1ine　because　of　YEN　apPreciation　and　of　qua1ity　upgrading
of　t血e　Japanese　car　i㎜port。（Unit　price　of　im，ported　car　went　up．）
A」u切mobi1e此一ad追issuesi呵1980s
　　　　工n　ユ98！，facing　the　strong◎pposition　from　’US　auto　industry　to
Japa皿ese　car　i㎎port，Japanese　govem㎜e皿t　adopted　a　compromising
strategy．It　introduced　V」ER（V」oluntary　Export　Restraiut）in　response
to　US　govern．ment－s　request．This　VER　is　a　trade　po1icy　in　which　alユ
exporting　ccuntry（in　t肚s　case哩Japan）“vo1叩tarily”lim－it　tbe　mmber　of
go◎ds　exported　to　the　i皿pQrting　country（United　States）acccrding　to
the　requ」est　of　the　im，Portin9・Part1鵬r．
　　　　A．t　the　sa皿e　ti皿」e，J專pa皿ese　auto．㎜akers　began　openi口g　transpla砒
fad1ities　i口the　United　States，a1〕d　col：ユ」ti．n・ued　to　tak」e　increased　shares◎f
t】〕e　US　auto迦鉗ket　fro㎜the　US，B．ig　Three　au亡o皿鋤ufacturers∴During
ユ2　N」ihon止ei星誠Sb』L皿bu皿Shaパeds、）D⑪c岨迎」釦t：lN」三ehibei　Jidous止a’Kyougiσap畠皿一U」S
auto皿Φbile鵬9otiatio口）、Tokyo11脳o皿kei鯛iSbユ瓜bu皿Sha，ユ995岳P，1＆
5，5
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the1980s，while　the　Japanese　Go∀ern㎜ent・maintained　vo1untary　export
quotas　ofユ、6　mi1lion　units　and　later2．3皿iuion／mits　per　year，13
Japanese　a1〕tomakers　increased　total　unit　sales　in　the　US　by　opening
se▽en　pIants　there．In　the　sa血e　period，US　domestic　prod1エcers　had　to
close　the　same　number　of　plants．14　Through　the　1980s，Japanese
automakers　accelerated　their　shift　from　a　strategy　of　direct　exports　to
the　US　t〇一ward　a　transpIant　and　exporting　luxurio1工s－car　strategy，15
Reasons　for　this　shift　inc1uded　the　post＿P1aza　appreciation　cf　the
Japanese　yen　after1985；the　slユccess　of　Honda　and　Toyota　in　managing
trarisp1ant　production　in　the　US　during　the1980s；American　dealer
req1ユes亡s　for　Japanese　com血itments　to　the　US血arket；16and　the　pro－
1iferation　of　US　trade　restrictions　such　as1ocaI　content　requirements，17
Japanese　autos　manufactured　in　these　transplant　faci1ities　deprived　the
」US　Big　Three　automakers　of　much　of　their　market　share　in　the1980s．
」At　one　point　in　the　ear1y1990s，Honda　even　surpassed　Chrysler　and
brief1y　became　the　number　three　se1ler　in　the　US　market．18
」Au切mobi1e仕拙e　issues　im1990s
Despite　the　Japanese“∀o1untary”export　restraints，the　U’S　was
13　See　Tomiura（1995）p．206，According　to　Mr．工chiro　Sakata，a　MlTI　officia一。th三s
　volu皿tary　restraint　was　not　very1imiting　because　the2－3　血inion　units盆11owed　in
　1985were　so　l〕ig　that　the　number　accounted　for　a1mos士20％oi　the　US　automobile
　market．（Author’s　persoI1al　interview　oIl　July20，ユ995．）
14　Tabb（1995）pp．115－117．The　seマen　plants　are　HondaもMarysville　plant　in　Ohio，
　Nissan’s　p1加t　in　Temessee，Toyota’s　plant　in　Kentucky，Mitsubishi’s　p］ant　with
　Chrysler　m　minois，and　Fuji　Heavy　I皿dustry　and　Is1ユzu’s　p1ant　in　Indiana；this　data
　土rom　Japan　Automobi1e　Mamfacturers」Association　is　cited　i皿Gyoten（1994）p．104．
15　See　p，70of］≡Iart（1992）．
ユ6　H．art（1992）p．251；also，persoIla1i耐ervlew　w1th　Sakaねon　July20，ユ995．
ユ7Tho血asR．Ho柳el1加dA1盆nWilliamWo〕ff、由工apan’’inHo湘11加dWo雌（1992），p，121．
ユ8　A11the　daぬhere　ca皿be　found　in　Japan　A1ユtomobi工e　Asso亡iation，Jidosha　Handbook
　くTokyo：JAMA　Press，1994）．
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unab1e　to　reduce　its　trade　deficit　with　Japan　in　theユ990s．ユ9　To　make
the　matters　worse，there　remained　a　huge　a㎜」ount　of　automobile　and
auto　parts　trade　deficit－Parts　trade　increased　because　of　the　transp1ant
strate駆of　Japanese　firms．Also，monetary　value　of　automobi1e　trade
remained　high　both　because　of　YEN　appreciation　and　because　of　unit
va1ue　increase　from　the　product　upgrading　of　Japanese　cars．For
examp1e，of　the＄59biuicn　bilatera1trade　imbalance　between　the　US
a皿d　JaPan　in1993，the　i皿bala皿ce　from　car　and　car－Parts　accounted　for
60％，for　a　tota1of＄36，5biuicn．20　So，the　United　States　began　to　urge
Japan　to　take　stronger　actions　to　e1iminate　this　trade　imbalanceI21
　　　　In　January　1992，US　President　Bush（Senior）visited　Tokyo　to
pursue　the　goal　of　reducing　trade　deficit　with　Japan　by　promoting　the
sales　of　US　cars　in　Japan．22　President　Bush　invited　executives　of　the
US　Big　Three　autom」akers　to　accoエnpany　him　on　the　trip，These
executiYes　did　accompany　the　US　President，but　then　they　made　their
own　agree皿ent　with　Japanese二m」a則facturers　independent1y　of　the’US
Government，Their　Japanese　counterparts“agreed　to　a　goal　of　increas－
ing　purchases　of　American　auto　parts　by＄10billion　between1990t0
1995．”23Thus，indirectIy，’US　negotiators　were　successfu1in　gaining　an
indication　fro狐Japanese　automakers　that　numeric包1targets　wou1d
！9　Fro瓜here，I　a皿simp－y　sumIn息ri尾i皿g　the　opinions跳pressed　in士he　pressヰI　do
　　disagreethevali砒yoftheses鮒e皿1e皿tsasa口acad帥iceconom」ist、正npri・cipal，
　　trade　defエcit　witb　o鵬tr且ding　par士ner　me帥s皿oth」ing，U」S　trade　deficユt（against　a1l　the
　tradbg　part聰ers）re＝mai皿s　high　beoause　of　low　saYi口gs　rate　a㎜ong　US　households，
20　Nige工Holloway，“C鮒s　Ho1d　the　Key，冊．F」ar　Easterエ1Economic艮eview．Octユ3．1994，
　P，20，
2！　As　an　academic　econo仰」ist，I　feel　that　th」is　state皿eηt　is皿oピ｛eco皿o皿ically　correcゼ
　Trade　de丘cit　between　two　count伽s　does卿t　m軍tter　at　a11珊hereas　globaIヒrade
　　deficit孤ay工natter　in　the工O口9ru几
22　T」his　s自teme皿t1s　also　i皿correct　i工1ten皿s　of　ec⑪n9㎜ics－This　is　a　su皿1Ilary　of　tbe
　press　opi皿i9皿，not　mln筍，
231畑d靱（！995），P，375、
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work．In　the　recent　book　about　USTR，Dry’den．put　it＝“The　Bush
administration　had　added　more　grounds　for　future　trade　negotiators　to
・卿・f・…s・lt・、・ath・・th・・j・・tp・・mi…，f・・mth・J・p・n…、棚US
politica1　pressure　a1so　led　Japan　亡o　tighten　its　Y01untary　export　re－
straints　on　automobiles，reducing　the　ceiling　down　to1，65皿i11ion　units
inユ992，25causing　some　Japanese　car　dea1ers　in　the　US　to　go　out　of
business，
　　　　On　the　Japanese　side　iri　the　1992　negotiations，at　firs乞MITI
officia11y　refused　to　agree」with　US　negotiators“demands　for　numerica1
targets　in　the　name　of　opposition　to　managed　trade．Tokyo’s　negotiators
were　under　great　domestic　pressure　not　to　agree　to“managed　trade”on
car　parts，26and　refused　to　set　import　quotas　or　even　targe・ts　for
specific　sectors．27　0n　the　other　hand，some　Japanese　poIiticians
thought　that　Japan　shou1d　repay　the　US　for　moral　debts　owed　after
World　War　II，and　insisted　that　Japan　should　somehow　a㏄ommodate
the　USl　It　was　the　then　Prime　Minister　Kiichi　Miyazawa　who　thought
that　Japan　shouId　not　worsen　the　re1ationship　with　the　United　States，
Miyazawa　even　cal1ed　the　CEO　of　Toyota　individua11y　and　tried　to
convince　Mrl　Toyota．泌　This　pressure　sometimes　caused　MITI　to　adopt
points　of　view　different　from　those　of　Japanese　automakers．For
exam．p1e，at　the　ti血e　of」Presiden亡Bush’s1992trip　to　TapanゴM’ITI　began
to　press　Japanese　automakers　to　raise　prices，to1en鉢hen　model　cyc1es，
24　Dryde皿（1995）、p，376．
25　L盆rry　Ar皿strong　and　Kare皿Lowry　M111er，＾Japan’s　Sudden　Deceleration＝Is
　　Detroit　Wiming　Back　Share－or］s　Tokyo　Givmg’It　Up？’’Business　Week．ユme8．
　　1992，p．26．
26　Tokyo　negotiators　tried　to　avoid　the　same　mistake　they　made　in　an　eaで1ier　failed
　皿egotiation　abo血t　se皿i－co工id1』，ctor　trade，which　gave　an　impression　to　the　US
　鵬gotiators　that　Japan　had　con｛irmed　numeric盆1targe㎏、
27Awanohara（1993）一P．96且
28　Nlhonkeizai　Sh1皿bun　S1ユa（1995），P，ユ9、
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and　to　decrease　their　w・orkjng　hours　in　order　not　to　increase．market
sbares　iエi　the　US　car　market，29　At　first，Toyota　refused　to　bow　to
MITI’s　pressure；but，｛i．nally，it　followed　other　Japanese　carmakers　that
wanted　to　avoid　losses　from　US　activation　of　its“Super301岨trade＿
protection1aw，In　the　end，Japanese　automakers　sought　ways　to　com＿
promise　with　the　US　Big　Three　auto　manufacturers　by　making　prom－
ises　to　purchase　US　car　parts　and　cars．Therefore，during　Bush’s　trip，
the　five　top　Japanese　car　m」akers－Toyota，Nissan，H」onda，Mitsubishi，
and　Mla勿da－announced　purchase　plans　for　US　auto　parts　and　US
automobi－es　from　US　manufacturers，30　It　was　successful　in　a　sense
that　both　US　and　Japan　sides　cou1d　avoid　the　trade　war、’But　it　was　not
successfu1in　a　sense　that　this　way　of　so1ving　trade　issues－M－ITI
intervened　the　Pri▽ate　business　and　cooperated岨1nanaged　trade”　一　1eft
a　scar　in　the　history　of　US－Japan　trade　negotiatゴ㎝s，3ユWhat　kind　of　a
scar？　The　next　phrase　by　a　US　negotjator　Jeffrey　Garden，Vice
Minister　of　Departm」ent　of　Com」merce，ITA（Intemationa1Trade　Agency）
represents　the　point：“Why　MITI　sayぺNo！nowエin1995negotiation］
after　haYi㎎done　a1ot　of皿an」aged　trade　unti1t◎day？Wthout　a
’マo1卿tary　plan’（＝nu狐eriCal　t乳rget），we　cannot　agree．’’32
2－B，A　Pre1ude　t①1995negotiation
　　　　In」！993，the　new」αinton　Ad狐inistration　in　the　US　a1so　picked　auto
a・dauto－Partstradeas亡hemintopicfortradenegotiati㎝s（so－ca1led
framework　ta1ks，or后脳o一妙昭｛）with　Japan，The　C1inton　Ad．㎜inistratio皿
took　a　tougher　st狐ce　tban　had　i仁s　predecessor　（the　B．ush　．Ad一
瓜inistration）．President■C1intQ皿　may　have　decided　to　use　auto　trade
　　　Person」a1i■terview　with　M」ITI　of正icial　Ich」iro　S乱kata　o貝」J口］y20，ユ995．
30　Awa皿ohara（1993，p，96）a聰d，Do　R迎sarig（ユ993，p，80）。
31N」iho砒e工ぬS虹卿bu止nSba（1995．P，19）、
32　Cited　i口Nihonkeizaj　Sh工叩bu瓜Sh軋（ユ995，p．20〕．
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issues　to　he1p　him　for　theユ996Presidential　e1ection，33　（And　it　seemed
to　work，right？）He　claimed　that“mfair”Japanese　trade　practices　were
a　threat　to　American　economic　welfare，and　demanded　that　Japan　accept
an　import　program　with　numerical　targets　for　purchases．34　The　goal
of　US　trade　negotiators　seelned　to　have　shifted　fro皿restricting　exports
to　fcrcing　Japan’s㎜arket　to　open，Even　though　Japan　has　no　tariffs　or
quotas　o」n　cars　and　car　parts，the　C1inton　AdministratioI1argued　that
Japan’s　皿arket　was　“in　fact　c1osed”　by　its　auto－nakers’　system　of
exc1usive　dea1erships，35　Japanese　critics　responded　that　the　US　Big
Three　carmakers　already　had　twice　as　many　outlets　in　Japan　as　did　au
EuroPean．carmakers　combined，but　so1d　fe双er　cars　because　of1ack　of
right＿hand　drive　mode1s　and亡he　larger　size　of　US　cars，36　（Since工was
driving　a　car　in　the　US　when　I　was　a　graduate　student　in　the　US，I　can
compare　the　width　of　the　roads　between　US　and　Tapan，We　have
narrower　roads　in　Tokyo　than　the　ones」in　the　US　cities．Tokyo　roads
are　narrcwer　than　even　the　ones　in　Boston，where　the　roads　are
reIatively　narrower　in　the　US．In　Boston，compared　with　Ca1ifomia，
aren’t　there　many　Vo1ks　Wageパ‘compact”cars？I　do　not　want　to　drive
a1994model　of　Ford　Taurus　on　the　road　in　Tokyo　because　it　is　tco
large　although　I　would　drive　a1997mode1of　Taurus　because　it　is
compact．）When　theseユ993－1994negotiations　between　the　US　and
33　Dornbusch（1995，p．20），
34　“1馴orant　Ar皿ies，”Nationa1Review，Ju血e26．1995．P．20．
35Howell　and　Wolf｛（1992，p．ユ22）．
36　Various　sources　talks　about　these　issues；for　examp1e，see　varlous　MITI（currently
　METI）pamph1etsl“Is　Japanese　C・ar　Market　Closed㌘Jme1995；’Fact　Sheets
　Reg盆rding　US一〕apan　Auto　and　Auto　p劃rts　Issue皿工une1995．and　the“Dear　Mickey’’
　盆dvertisement　in　the　magazi皿eτHE　ECOW0㎜∫ア，June24．！995，p．63，The　similar
　sta旋ments　were　made　also　in　the　TV　i口tervlew　of　Trade　Minister　Hashmoto（then）
　on℃hikushi　Tetsuya’s　News23，…broadcasted　on　TBS　Te1evision　on　Jme28．1995
　iuTokyo．
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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　orl　w11y　Jap靱beca皿e司ssertiYe　toward　US呵egotiat⑪rs　　　　　　　　　，6ユ
Japan　fai1ed　to　acbieve　any　co｛c畑sio口s，US　Preside耐αinto皿decided
t◎e工1ter　the　US－Japan　auto　lnegotiation　of1995，
3，Thepr㏄essoftheautomgotiati㎝
　　　　The　㎜ain．negotiatio口　between　USTR　and　MITI　took　p1ace　at
Un，ited　Nations　bui1ding　in　Geneva　fro㎜June21to　June28．1995，I　wi11
e＝xplain　be1ow　the　process　of　the1995negotiation　by　paying　attention
to　three　stages　of　negotiation：　Pre工1egotiation　phase，　the　negotiation
table，迅nd　p◎st　negotiation．There　were牛hree　agenda　in　this　negotiation；
deregu1ation　of　auto　parts　market，1ibera1ization　of　Japan’s加伽召なμ
dea1ership，and　Yo1untary　purchasing　p1狐by　Japanese　automakers．
Bec測se　U」SrTapan　easi1y　ca卿e　to　an　agreement　Qn　first　two　agenda　but
not　on．the　last　one，most　of　the1995negctiation　was　about」wbether
Jap狐e§e　govern皿ent　c卿affect　Japanese　automakers　so　that　they　wil1
pu｝ici冤e　such　a　voIuntary　purchase　pl＝a皿、MITI　strong1y　refused　to
come　up　with　vo1mtary　plan　whi1e　USTR」c！ai皿ed　that　the　plan　is　the
key　in　the　negotiation　劃nd　they　w」cI1’t　agree　with－out　those　plans
includiqg　nu卿erica1figu，res，
US　pre－megotiatio皿P．has㊤
　　　　Before　he　left　for　the皿ain　negotiation　iエユGeエ1eva，Ira　Shapiro，
General　Council（legal　adviser）of　USTR，eogaged　in　u皿officia1pre－
negOtiatiOns　with　US　auto　industries－represeutatiYes　fr◎皿’Big　Three
auto皿akers，industry　association　for　auto　parts，則d　UAW．37The
purpose　of　this　Prenegotiation　i§to．9et　a　cc皿sensus　abcut　the　e夏tent　to
・w・hi・ht止eUSside（as・wh・1e）・・皿co皿・ede，ShaPiroco・ldnotreacha聰
agree皿」ent　with　U」S　aut◎虹dustry　on　the　day　before血e　bqgiming　of
the　GeneYa　table，but　be　becaエロe　confident　because　he　fe1t　that　he　could
皿anagetole汕eindustryunders垣、nd’withIhポs鮒et’’concessionplan
37Niho口如切iSlM仰b・・§ha（工995，PJ6）。
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withJapan．38
J叩㎜pm－negotiati㎝Phase
　　　　The　relationship　between　MITI　and　Japanese　auto　industry　has
been▽ery　c1ose　and　the　both　parties　kept　contacting　each　other　before
and　during　the　negotiation．39　Thus　they　do　not　seem　to　have　any
forma1meetings　as　pre＿negotiation，Bu主it　is　true　that　both　sides　meet
frequently　to　discuss　how　they　wi．11face　the　issue　together－And　it　is
told　that　this　informal　pre－negotiation　was　conducted　with　a　strong
leadership　of　MITI，4o　MITI　had　been　advising　auto　皿akers　not　to
pub1icize　voluntary　p1ans　before　MITI，and　they　agree　to　fo1low　MITI
ad▽ice，41　This　was　to　keep　consistency1nside　Japan（between　the
govemm．ent　and　industry）that　Japan　would　not　concede　to　the　un－
reasonable　request　from　US．
Pm－mgo曲tiom　Phase：S㏄ret　me鮒ng　im　the　H汕f弧
　　　　Six　days　before　the　Geneva　negotiation　tab1e，pre－negotiation
among　three　negotiators　took　p1ace　in　the　s1』burbs　of　Ha1ifax，Canada
where　the　Summit　was　going　on，The　血embers　were　Ira　Shapiro
（USTR），Sakamoto（MITI），and　Watanabe（MITI，the　Director　General　of
the　bureau　of　machinery　information　industry）．The　main　topic　here
was　about　the‘vo1untary　p1an’of　Tapanese　auto　manufacturers．The
voluntary　plan　discussed　here　was　not　about　a　mere　numerica1target，
to　which　MITI　had　been　opposed，Japan　side　changed　their　attitude
from　no　vo1untary　plan　at　al1to　admit　voluntary　plan　by　automakers．
US　side　changed　their　attitude　from　that　vo1mtary　plan　should　inc1ude
38Nihonkei・alShi皿bmSha（1995，P，17）．
39　I口terview　with　Yuki　Sadami底・u　on　Apr訂ユ9．1997．
40Niho・keizaiShimbunSh・（ユ995，PP．81－11O）．
41　Nihonkeizai　Sh三mbun　Sha（ユ995，pp－81－110）．
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numerical　amou，nt　of　auto・parts　pu」rchase　by　Japanese　makers　tO　that
voluntary　plan，shou1d　not　necessarily　include．n」umerica1target　a－s　long・
as　it　ensures　the　implication　of　future　increase　iエi　auto　parts
Purchase，42
　　　　．Later，both　US　and　Japan　sides　revea1ed　the　usefulness　of　this
secret　meeti，ng　at　Ha1ifax　as　fol1ows，US　govern皿ent　officia1：“The
usefu－1ness　of　the㎜eeting　was　the　fact　that　we　came　to　know　that　fi▽e
Japanese　automakers　were　preparing　their　volu・ntary　plans，”MITI
officia／：“We　came　to　know・that　U」S　goverment　got　upset　by　WTO
工iling」of　Japan　and　that　they　are　also　serious　about　sanction　on　June
28．”43
庇mvanego伽i㎝Table
　　　　In1995，for．more　than　two　years，the　argument　between　US　and
Japanese　govern肌ents　had　been」total1y　apart，US　sid－e　claimed　that
JaP狐ese　market　was　c1osed　and　uΩfair　whereas　Japan　side　rejected　US
argu㎜ent　as　the　irrationa1c1ai卿for’‘nulnerical　objective．”似On　M－ay16，
ユ995，U」S　govem呵」en、亡Pub1ici2ed　the　sa工1ction1ist　for　Japanese1uxurious
car1ike　Lexus　and　Infinity，45　Then，Japanese　government　filed　a　suit
in　WTO　pane1in　response　to　the　s狐cticn1ist，Since　US　set　the
dead1i］：ユe　for　the　sancti◎n，both　sides　agreed　to　meet　befcre　the　d」ead」1ine
tc　seek｛or　mutua1beneficial　outcomes．That　was　a　week　length　of　the
Geneva　negotiation　fro皿Jun－e21to　June28，ユ995．
　　　　The　fact　that　US・publicized　the　sanctionユist　for　Japa・皿ese　luxurir
ous　cars　1皿ay　be　considered　as　a　creation　of　れクθ惚∫5，　whic，h　is　a
con」sid」erably　we工1－studied　ccnce二Pt　in　th－e　negotiation　studies，．But　this　is
、42
43
似
45
Ni止⑪皿ke工蜘＝S世h，imbun　sh尋（ユ995．pp，24呈30）且
Nih㎝k」e蜘Shi凪bu口Sha（1995，P呈30）、
N」独on畑聰iShi皿b卿Sba（ユ995，P，15）．
Ni地皿keizaiSh畑」b岬Sha（ユ995，P．15）、
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not　a　natura1ripe．This　artificial　making　of　ripeness　sure1y　created
resentment　in　Japan＿side　negotiators．This　creation　of　ripeness　not　only
did　not　work　well，but　a1so　lead　both　sides　to　invite　an　esca1ation　in　the
negOtiatiOn，
　　　　In　the　Gene▽a　table，there　were　three　agenda　in　this　negotiation：
（！）Dere馴1ation　of　Japanese　repair　parts　market，（2）Opening　Japanese
“Keiretsゴdea1ership，and（3）The　increase　in　the　purchase　of　US　made
autopartsbytheJapaneseautomakers．AUSnegotiatorJeffrey
Garden，Vice　Miエiister　of　Depar亡ment　of　Commerce　ITA（Intemational
Trade　Agency），told　the　press　that　a1l　of　these　three　agenda　were▽ery
important　and　US　side　cou1d　mt㎜iss　one，46　In　fact　first　two　agenda
were　a1血ost　agreed　by　both　parties，the　key　issue　in　the　Geneva　tab1e
was　the　third　one，about　the　purchase　of　US　parts　by　Japanese　makers，
This　fina1agenda　was　the　most　difficu1t　and　the　center　of　the　dispute
because　this　is　the　main　point　which　the　Japanese　govemment　wanted
to　avoid　a　concession．The　agenda　was　c1early　against　the　principles
MITI　adopted　this　time：‘No　govemment　inter▽ention　into　business’and
‘No　numerica1target、’47
　　　　After　the　first　day　of　the　Geneva　tab1e，MITI　Director（Automobile
DiYision）Atsushi　Ooi　stated　that　it　was　unacceptable　for　Tapan　side
with“numerical　target”in　any　kind　and　that　there　was　sti11a1arge　gap
between　US　and　Japan，On　the　other　hand，US　negotiators　responded　to
his　statement　that　they　agreed　with　Mr．Ooi　about　the1arge　gap
between　US　and　Japari　buモthat　US　side　did　not　requesピ’mmerica工
target”and　wou1d　do　anything　to　reach　an　agreement－
　　　　At　night，four　of　the　both　sides’negotiators　got　together　to　attend
an　unofficia1meeting　to　discuss孤ith　H伽肋（the　Japanese　word皿eaning
the　rea1thought　and　true　intention，the　situation」when　yo1ユsay“I　lnea正i
46　Nihonkei乞ai　Sh三mb血血S止a（ユ995，p，18）．
47　正wll　wrlte　more　about　the　MITl　negotiation　princ三ples－ater　in　this　paper一
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it”）一1・thi・伽μu・officia1皿eeti㎎，both・ide・・…ededto9・inth・
feeling　of　future　settlement　by　ta1king　each　other　honest1y，
　　　　Unable　to　reach　an　agreement　in　the　first　four　day　deputy－Ievel
negotiation．both　Mickey　Kantor（Trade　Representative，US）and　Ryu－
taro．HashiInoto（Trade’M」inister，Japan）arrived　in　Geneva　to　seek　for
the　fina1settlem」ent　at　the　Ministeria1－1evel　on　Jme26，two　days　before
the　activation　of　the　sanctions，
　　　　Hashimoto　revealed　the“G1oba1Vision”（二：voluntary　p1an）created
by　Japal：1ese　automakers　but　he　added　that　the　Plan　should　accord　with
the　WTO　rules，not　the　US　Section301rules．Kantor　requested　the
numerical　figures　in　the　plan　but　H」ashimoto　refused　to　do　sc．Here，
Japan　c1ear1y　conceded　sc皿ewhat，but　US　side　sti11stuck　to口umerical
figures．
　　　　Fina11y，the　agree瓜ent　was　reached　in　the　fo11owing　manner．
Hashimoto　gave　Kantor　the　vo1untary　pla皿of　five　Japanese　automakers，
but　did　not　include　the　num」erica1amount　of　purchase　fro・m」US　parts
nlakers・Instead　of　giving　the　final　num」erica1figures　to　the　US　side，
Japanese　side　gave　the　back　ground　infor・mation　such　as　the　one　that
Toyota　aims　the1ocaユcontents　standard　according　to　NAFTA　standard，
This　aucws　US　side　to　calcu1ate　the　estimated　figures　of　the　purchase
of　US　made　parts　by　Japanese　makers．Sti1I　Kantor　had　to　negotiate
with　Washi晦on　D．C　and　crdered　spokesperson　A㎜Rusato（Luzato？）
to　create　two　documents　for　both“agreem．ent’’and“rupture明cases，
After　getti皿g　consent　fro皿W」ashi晦㎝，Ka皿tor・went　into　the　final
negotiation　table　with」Mi．ユ1istcr　Hashimot◎，ResQ1uti◎n　document　was
w◎rked　by　both　Shapiro　and　S＆kamoto，When　Kantor　p亘cked　up　the
document狐d　told　the．m　that　was　fine，Hashimoto　also　looked　at　it　and
亡ben　they　shook　h，an」ds　atユユa1〕ユJune28．1995．遡
螂肚⑪皿k鯛あSh山皿bu聰Sb息（！995．PP，銚一72），
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Postmgoti崩㎝一P肥ssm1e己se
　　　　Even　though，in　the　main　negotiation，I　asserted　that　the　negotia－
tion　failed　mainly　because　of　US　side　negotiators，I　would　argue　it　was
Japan　side　who　did．not　work　wel1in　the　after－negotiation　phase．I　wi1l
expユain　why　chronologically，
　　　　After　the　press　conference，tbe　world　press　people　shared　a
strange　fee1ing　about　the　fina1document．“Is　this　a　rea1agreement
document？’1The　officia1document　was　a　ful1of　blank．There　was　no
nu㎜bers　which　Kantor　c1aimed　that　US　must　ha▽e　gotten　from　Jap・an．
Moreover，　at　the　end　of　those　b1anks，　the　remark　said，　“］〉［inister
Hashimoto　stated　that　Japanese　governlnent　had　nothing　to　do　w’ith　the
estimated　figures　here　because　the　estimated　figure　exceeds　the　respon＿
sibi1ity　of　the　govem㎜ent，Minister　Hashimoto　also　stated　that　this
estimation　is　solely　done　by　USTR，”49This　document　itse1f　was　fine，
but　Japan　side　negotiators　were　not　successfu1in　the　fol1ow－up　phase．
　　　　US〕〕egotiators　were　very　good　at　justifying　their　outcome　and
succeeded　in　convincing　most　public　that　they　were　successful　in
achieving　numerica1target　whiIe　Japan　side　did　not　protested　the
mis馳ided　US　statement　」which　was　beyond　the　scope　of　the
negotiation．50　US　negotiators　emphasized　that　the　agreement　included
numerical　targets　and　claimed　that　the　agreement　was　resu1t　oriented．
Furthermore，they　handed　in　the　reference　document　t刷ed‘‘agreed　fact
sheet”which　could　be　interWeted　as　the　agree血ent　with　Japanese
negotiators．But　it　was　obvious　that　there　was　not　strong　Japanese
opposition　to　the　fact　sheet　unti1Secretary　Generai　Igarashi　officiaHy
stated　that　American　docun1ent　was　just　an　estimation　by　on1y　US　side
on　the　following　day，5！　I　believe　Japan　shou1d　ha▽e　announced　the
49　　Niho血．kei2盆i　Sh三mb血n　Sh註（ユ995－p，75）、
50Ishii（ユ996，PP．22－23）、
5！Ishil（1996，P．23）、
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opPositicn　to　the　US　press　rele裂se　soo止r，
4．W，y　J理m　s蛆e　became　assertive？
　　　　In　the1995negotiatio］〕」s，M工TI　of　Japan　took　a　strong　stance
against　nu皿erica1targets狐d　the　MITI　n．egotiators　kePt　refusing　tc
concede．I　wil1give　seYera1reasons　below　why　Japan　cou1d　take　more
assertive　stance　thal〕before．
4＿A．Inter皿al　chamge　in　Japan
　　　　This　Japan’s　asserti▽e　stance　was　fostered　by　a　m早jor　change　in
the　Japanese　congress．The　Liberal　DeI皿ocratic　Party，which　had
governed　Japan　froエn1955，1ost　its一肌ajcrity　in　tbe　Japanese　Diet　first
ti肌e　since　then　in1993，and　the　new　leader　Morihiro　Ho§okawa　fro卿
the　Japan　N」ew　Party　becam」e　the　pri肌e　ministεr一“Deregu1ation”was　a
s／ogan　o｛tbe　new　Hosokawa　Administration，an－d　this　slogan　he1ped
win　Japanese　pub1ic　opposition　to　the“皿anaged　trade”proposal　of　the
US　negotiators．It　was　the　Prim」e　Minister　Hosoka’wa　who　first　said
“No珀to　the　United　States：
“’For　these　tweエity　and　thirty　year§，b◎th　’US　and　Jap・aエi　have
always　concluded　trade　negotiatjons　with　am，bi馴ous　outco’me§」t
w」as　a　genera1percepti◎エi　of　the　public　that　it　was　Japan　who，at
the　fina1stage，concedes　fro1皿‘foreign　pressure、’B」ecause　of　this，it
is　true　tカat　both　of　our　fmstration　have　been　accu皿u1ated．My
view　ofエユew　U－S畑p弧relatio・n　is　that　the　re1atio皿s上iipエ1eeds　to　be
theequ・lo皿eb飾・eentwo・d・lts（rathe・tha・th・un・qu・1・ela－
ticnship　betwe靱an　adu1t　and　a　chi1d），I　mea皿，in　a　such　relatio阯
sbiP，both　of　us　sl〕ould　say双hat　w－e　h」a・ve　to　say」and§h◎u工d　agree
with　only柳・hat椛e　w塾皿t　to貝9ree乳皿d　shou1d口ot　agfee’with棚七」at
・慨εC＆n皿Ot薮9ree。’’52
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　　　　After　the　Hosokawa　ad皿inistration，Liberal　Democratic　Party
（LDP）regained　its　po工itical　power　and　took　the　cabinet　back．53　But
this　time，there　was　a　generation　change　in　LDP　and　younger　politi－
cians　at　LDP　know　that　public　supported　Hosokawa’s　view　that　Japan
should　say‘No！when　necessary．Minister　Hashimoto　must　have　been
oneofthoseyom9（then）People．54Healsohadastron91eade・ship，
Such　forceful　leadership　of　the　new　Trade　Minister　Ryutaro　Hashimoto
（LDP）stren節hened　MITI’s　tough　stance　against　the　US　position．55
Japanese　academics　also　supported　MITI’s　point　of　view　by　pubhshing
」many　books　and　articles　with　macro－economic　argu血ents　in　supPort　of
the　stance　by　M’江TI．56
　　　　In1995，there　was　also　intemal　change　in　MIT工personne1，too，
Both　of　the　main　negotiating　positions，T8刎一3α〃∫肋〃g狛倣（The　Ne－
gotiator，Vice　Minister，of　the　Ministry　of　Intemationai　Trade　and
Industry）and　T醐＿∫ん㎝∫召｛8α肋　妙o㎞6んo（The　Director　General　of
trade　po1icy　b1ユreau）were　replaced　by　Sakamoto　and　Hosokawa（a
different　guy　from　the　former　prime　Ininister）who　are　familiar　with
GATT　rules　and　were　also　critica1to　MITI’s　weak　stance　at　the
se加｛conductor　negotiation　inユ986，Director亘eve1a工so　stren敏hened　the
assertiYe　stance　of　Japanese　negotiators．Newly　assigned　director　of
Americas　Division　of　MIT正，Masakazu　Toyoda，has　been　regarded　as
“tough　negotiator”by　US　side　because　he　did　not　compromise　on　the
52　The　s㎞te皿ent　w日s　lnade　by（the而）Ptime　Minister　Hosokaw盆on　Febmary！1．
　1994．This　is　the　author’s　tra皿slatio皿from　the　origina1Japa口ese　citation　in　Ni－
　honkeizai　Shimburi　Sha（1995，p．18！）．
53　This　politlcaI　reg劃in　by　the　LDP卯as　not　fu工一y　utih2ed　because　i血order　to　get亡he
　majority　in　the　diet，the　LDP　had　to　for皿a　coaIit三〇皿with　the　Socialist　Party　whose
　head，Mr昌Mur盆y盆ma，had　beco血e　the　Prme　Mi口ister，
54　In皿yサiew、…
55　正nterview　with　Ichiro　Sakata　on　Iuly20．1995，
56　To　n盆血e　a　few，see　Motosh三ge　Itδh（ed．）（ユ994）一
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princip1e　oガNo　numericaユtargeピThis　strong　stance　was　fostered　by
his　background　as　a、測u1ti1ateral，negotiator　in　OECD．A1though　he　now
works｛or“．Americas”division，he　had皿ever　lived　in　the　US，an」d　he
had　been　working　in　Paris　fcr　the　Organi2ation　of　Economic　Coopera－
tign　and　DeYelopment，As　a　result，he　does　n◎t　foster　the　idea　that
US二Japan　relationship　is　most　i加portant　a皿d　that　eco工10皿ic　issue
sho・1d・otp…entf・omk・epi㎎・・ch・“9ood”・e1・tio・ship，57
　　　　These　legis1ative　and　administrative　changes　in　Japan　contributed
to　the　changes　in　Japanese皿egotiating　styles　from　compro．mising　to
rather　assertive．
4□B，R①1e　ofWTO（Wor1dTrade　O哩nizati㎝）
　　　　Helping　to　press　both　the　US　and　Japan　towards　a　settleエnent　in
1995was　a　new皿u」1tiI飢er．a1mecha皿ism　for　resolution　of　trade　negotia－
tions　a皿d　disp晦s，the　World　Trade　Organizatio皿（WTO）．The　exis－
tenc．e　of　W」TO　obviously　contributed　to　the　stren鉢hened　Japan二s
BATNA」or　a1ter蝸tives　to　a皿Qn　agreeme皿t　case．Of　course，both　Japan
a」nd　the’US　were　me㎜」bers　of　WTO、鋤」d　both　threatened　to　take
co皿plaints　about　the　other　to　this．new　re馴1ator　of’world　trade．But　it
was　well㎞c’wn　to　both　sides　that　the　reso1ution　of　WTO　djspute　panel
will　be　fawab1e　to　J即an，and　the　e茎istence　oポWTO　is　a　s◎u，rce　of
i皿creased皿egotjating　power　of　Japan　side，not　of　US　side－
　　　　H」ere’s　a　brief　sum卿ary　of　what’s　happened　over　WTαThe
Japanese　said　thatthey　w・ould　go　to　the　WTO　againstany・mi1ateral　U」S
i．狐pcsit亘on　cf　tariffs　cn　JaPanese1雌ury　cars－For　its　Part，the　US
threatened　to　take　Jap狐to　t上e　WTO　for　its　invisible　trade　barriers－
c包rte1－1ike　de乳！ings　and　bu§in」e§s－g0Yer則ne皿t◎ou皿sio皿r　wbich§h1ユt　lU」S
迅uto　parts　out　of　the　Japa皿e§e皿一鉱ket駆　H」owever，accordiIlg　to　Clyde
57’剛h⑪口蝸獺iShi．mbunSh．a（1995．p，33）品
58胸msw地J肌t・ki（1995，P．35），
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PrestrOwit2Jr．，President　of　the　Econo㎜ic　Strategy　Institute，US　ne＿
gotiators　seemed　to　realize　that　the　WTO　would　probably’not　favor　the
US　because　many　WTO　members　were　against　mi1ateral　trade　sanc－
tions　by　the　US，and　many　others　saw　Japanese－style　co11usive　prac－
tices　as　important　tools　for　their　own　economic　deve1opment，59　The
threat　of　WTO　inter▽ention　seemed　to　pressure　both　Japan　and　the　US，
especially　USTR，away　from　trade　war．
　　　　A1so，there　was　a　reason　why　C1inton　ad血inistration　could　not
push　Japan　harder　in　this　WTO　issues，Accordi㎎to　Anderson（1996），
there　was　an　atmosphere　in　theαinton　administration　that　many
people　fe1t　this　way，“How　can　the　administrati㎝disregard　the　WTO
afterabigefforttoc・eatethem？”60
4－C．J理㎜，sother　altem棚ves　than　WT0
　　　　Other　than　a　fi1i㎎in　the　dispute　settlement　in　the　WTO，Japanese
side　was　preparing　an　altemative1ist　when　the　negotiation　fai1ed．It
was　now　proved　that　MITI　was　preparing　the　case　of　breakdown　in　the
negotiation．It」was　reported　that　the　Director　Genera1（trade　po1icy
bureau）Hosokawa　had　beeηvisiting　prominent　poiiticians　in　order　t0
do　N2伽α〃α∫ん4　－　unofficial　consensus　bui1ding　system　in　Japanese
society，　to　lnake　potential　opPonents　understand　the　possibihty　of
drastic　ch醐ge　that　can　be　expected．The　number　of　the　po1itician
visited　by　MITI　officials　was　over　thirty－So　MITI　was　surely　expecting
th・pos・舳tyoH・il…i・亡h・a9・…le・t．61
　　　　We1l　then　what　were　the　altematives？In　response　to　the1■OO％
imposition　of　the　tariff　on　Japanese　luxurious　car，Japan　side　prepared
two　a1tematives11）Subsidizing　Japanese　automakers，and2）retaliation
59　　Borrus　with　Jaマetski（1995，p．35）、
60　Anderson（1996，p．30）．
61　Nihonkei五ai　Shimb1ユn　Sha（1995．p，58）．
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to　US　export　tc　Japan．62　The　nrst　one　includes　new－1aw　making　of
subsid」ization　to　a・ut◎皿akers．This　ai皿s　to　a11eviate　the　weakened
management　of　auto　manufacturers－The　second　one　is　not　necessary
agreed　by　the　all　peop1e　in　Japan，but　it　was　the　imposition　of　the1OO％
tariff　on　the　products　mainly　imported　fro皿U，S．such　as　airp1anes，
beef，orange，wheat，and　a　certain　type　of　chemical　products（which　is
produced　main1y　in　Arkansas）．Even　some　of　the　MITI　officials　with
strong　stance　toward　US　pushed　this　possibility，Minister　Hashimoto
was　so　prudent　that　he　opposed　to　the　idea　of　retaliation　with　violation
of　WTO　ru1es，63
　　　　Final1y，it　tumed　out　that　MITI　even　prepared　an　unrealistic
retaliation　possibility　in　financial　m」arket．Set　aside　the　feasibility　of
the　retaliation　p1an，it　was　a・卿」assive　sales　of　US　bond　heId　by　Bank　of
Japan　into　the　market，If　that　option　had　been　possib1e，the　massive
sa1es　wou1d　reduce’US　bond　price　and　thus　would1ead　to　high　interest
rate　in　the　US　market　which　would　have　given　a　huge　da㎜age　to　the
US　economy、銚
　　　　By　preparing　those　alternatives，TaPan　side　gained　a　negotiating
power．At1east，they　knew　what　they　wou1d　do　in　the　case　of
breakdow」1：L　Because　of　these　contingency　p1ans，Japanese　negotiators
did　not　hesitate　to　insist　their　merits　and　interests　rather　than　just　to
戴Ve　in。
5．Why　USmade　the　mgotiati㎝failure？
　　　　As　I　said　in　the　introduction　section，工Yiew　the皿ain　negotiation
was　a　failure　mostユy　because　of　US　side’s　bad　strate鮒．I　wil1．或ve　four
reasons　for　that．Let’s　look　at　them　one　by　one，
62NihonkeizaiS虹皿b口皿Sha（ユ995．P，59）．
63Nih⑪・kei竈・iShi卿buπSha（1995．PP－59－60）、
64’舳o晦i・・iShi卿b世nSha（ユ995，P，60）、
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5＿A，US，s岬sitiom一皿umeri631t；㎜get
　　　　The　first　reason　is　that　US　took　positional　stance　rather　than　that
of　principle－based　negotiators．Even　though　Japan　tried　to　cooperate
with　US　side　in　order　to　seek　mutua1ly　benefit　outcome　by　giving　the
concessions　on　several　points　such　as　deregu1ation　in　autc］］10biIe
inspection　system，US　negotiators　insisted　on　numerical　target　until　the
last　minutes．I　wondered　if　those　negotiators（most　of　them　are1awyers，
by　the　way）have　ever　read02材伽g広oγE∫．No　matter　how　hard　Japan
side　tried　to　convince　US　side　in　practica－aspects，Mickey　Kantor　did
not　seem　to1isten　to　anything　other　than　numbers．This　stance　was　a
typical　of　positiona1negotiators，The　situation　was　exact1y　like　the
positionai　negotiation　described　in　Fisher　and　Ury：“The　more　you　try
亡o　convince　the　other　side　of　the　impossibi1ity　of　changing　your　opening
pcsition，the　more　difficult　it　becomes　to　do　so，”65
　　　　The　validity　of　the　USTR’s　position　is　doubtfu1，too、。Fisher　and
Ury　also　pointed　out　the　iInportance　of　objective　criteria，66　USTR’s
request　or　position　doesn’t　seem　to　fit　with　the　objectiマe　criteria．The
request　cf　numerical　target　in　the　trade　for　a　particular　good　is　c1ear1y
a　vio1a亡ion　of　the　GATT　rules．67
　　　　In　contrast　with　the　USTR　negotiators，Japanese　side　tried　to　stick
to　the　princip1e　negotiation　method．The　MITI　Negotiator　Sakamoto
wrote　about　the“principle’’about　one　year　after　the　Geneva　negotiation
tab1e．
The　most　important　point　to　us　i正i　the　US－Japan　automobile
negotiation　was　in　our　stance　to　try　to　stick　to　the“Princip1e’’
65
66
67
Fishera口dUry（ユ991．P，5）。
Fisher　and　Ury（1991．p．8）、
Tominaga（1996，p．23）．
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based　ar、馴me此We　wa皿ted」t◎狐end　the’三co皿vepti㎝a1per－
ception”・一　wbet畑r　it　is’gQod　or　bad　－　whicb’was∫ormed
thro亡gh　a　fifty－year　1ong．U－S－JaPan　trade　negotiations　after　the
W」or1d　War　Two，68
　　　　Sakam」oto　contrasted　the“co皿ventional　perception”and　the　叫p＿
rincip1e”as　fo11ows，The　Japan　side“conventio皿a1perception”says　that
we　wm　lo§e　if　the　US　s狐ction　is　conducted　even　if　we　stick　to　the
principle　of　theエiegotiation－The　US　side“conventiona1perception”says
that　US　bluff　wil1s’ure1y1ead　to　the　Japan’s　last　min’utes　concession
and　that　once　if　we　convi．nce　MITI，we　can　affect　Japan’s　auto　industry
n6卿atter　how　hard　is　the　request．The　conseque皿ce　fo11owed　thcse
｝conventi◎nal　perceptions’’ha§　1ead　the　one－sided　agree’ment　i皿　the
semicond1■ctor　n－egotiation　wbich　is　regarded　as　su」ccess　of　the　US」TR
狐d　the　failure　of　the　M」ITL　Jap乳n｛ボprilncip工e岬in　this　auto　negotiation」，
according　to　Saka・m」oto，was　t・wo皿olds：1）The　principle　of　the　non－
intervention　of　the　government　to　the　l〕ユarkets　a皿d2）The　princip1e　of
theエnulti1atera1tr乱de　negotiation，w肚h　is　represented　by　the　WTO．69．
5－B，F3ilu1＝e　i皿」recog聰iziI1g　the6hamge　in　JaPa皿，s　neg①ha血Ilg　Power
　　　　It　was　true　that　Japan　had　conceded　a1ot卿ore　than　they　should
have　in　its　negotiating　his亡ory．But　tbis　ti卿e，Japan　did　口ot　haYe　to
concede■because　their　B」ATNA，had　ch則ged，They　now　have　a　better
alter皿ative　than　before，thus　JaPa川皿　has　皿1ore　⑪e9◎tiating　Power，As
Fisher　and　Ury　p皿t　it　in　tbεir　book，G功ま伽厚勿肥∫：“There　is　power虹
deve1oping　a　good　B．ATN．A，。“［Al　funda㎜enta1way　to　increase　your
鵬go血atio皿po珊er　is　by　i卿pr0Ying　your　walk＿away　a1ternative一｝70
68Sak狐⑪t⑪．（ユ996，PP，22－23）、
69S包ka賦o（！996，PP，22－23）乱
7C　Fisher・nd’U」・y（！99ユ，P，鵬）
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　　　　As　I　exp1ained　in　sections4－B　and4－C　in　this　paper，MITI
prepared　their　a－tematives　we11before　the　negotiation　itse1f　begins，
There　were　two　types　of　alternatives：O正ie　is　to　save　automakers　from
the　US　s加cti㎝and　the　other　is　the　retaliation　to　US　trade－With　the
com．bi皿ati㎝of　the　first　alternative　and　the」WTO　fi1i㎎，Japan　succeed－
ed　in　preparing　a　good　BATNA－Because　the　first　one　is　legitimate　with
respect　to　external　standards，whereas　the　second　option　of　reta／iation
was　not　a‘‘good”altematives，71　Fisher　and　Ury　expIained　the　i皿por＿
tance　of　extemal　standard　of1egitimacy　as　fb11ows：
There　is　power　in　using　extemal　standards　of　legiti血acy，You　can
use　standards　of1egitimacy　both　as　a　sword　to　persuade　others，
and　as　a　sh｛eld　to　he1p　you　resist　pressure　to　give　in　arbitrarily，
　　Convincing　the　other　side　that　you　are　asking　for　rio　more　than
is　fair　is　one　of　the　most　powerfu1arguments　you　can　make．72
　　　　Because　of　the　birth　of　WTO　in1995，Japan　got　a　support　from
extemal　standards．US’s　action（creating　fear　of　unilateral　sanction）is
clear1y　violation　oi　the　GATT／WTO　m1es．Japan’s　a卿ment　thatJapan
win　not　discuss　under　US　trade　law　section301is　legitimate，Of
course，if　US　real1y　put　a　sanction　on　Japanese　import，it　might　llave
hurt　Japanese　industry　in　a　short　time，but　Japan　knew　that　Japan　can
subsidize　those　Icsses　to　auton三akers　before　they　get　supPort　from　the
other　member　comtries　in　WTO　and　the　dispute　sett1ementエ皿echanism
of　WTO　wi1l　be　in　favor　of　Japan，Thus　Japan’s　a1tematiYe　was　fim
and　created　negOtiati工ig　POwer．
　　　　The　problem　of　US　negotiators　was　that　they　did　not　see血to　fuuy
7ユ　I皿tl】is　sense．Mi皿ist色r　Hashimoto　w’as　correct　since　he　opposed　to　the　seco瓦d
　OPimo」n，
72　　Fish虐r　and　Ury（1991，p．ユ83〕一
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　　　⑪n　wby　Jap加」became　assertlve　tow亀rd　US　negotlators75
regard　these　increased　power　in　Japan　as　important．The　reasons　why
US　side　could　not　appreciate　these　changes　in　Japan’s　altematives皿1ay
be　part1y　because　of　its　positiona1negotiating　stance（see　section5－A），
partly　because　of　stereotyped　image　of　bowing　Japanese（see　section
5－D）．
5－C．Failure㎞mders仇ndOrg㎜izati㎝a16h㎜geinJapamsegovemm㎝t
　　　　There　were　two　organizational　changes　in　Japan　side．One　is　in
politics，The　other　is　in　the　Ministry　of　Intemationa1Trade　and
Industry．These　changes㎜ade　Japan　side　take　a　different　way　of
negotiation．USTR　negotiators　fai1ed　to　capture　those　intemal　changes
and　therefore　this　ig皿orance　led　them　to　a　fai1ed　outcome　in　the
ne90tiatiOn，
　　　　Political　change　was　faciiitated　by　the　new　trend　in　Japanese
po1itics　in　1990’s，As　expressed　in　the　section4－A，there　was　a
generationa1change　from　o1d　LDP　members　to　new　po1iticians，The　new
trend　in　po1itics　al1owed　MITI　to　focus　on　economic　interests，rather
than　to　focus　on“maintaining　good　re1ation」ship　w・ith　United　States、｝
　　　　With　a　help　from　po1itical　climate　change，the　Japanese　govern㎜一
ent，esPecially　M」ITI　succeeded　in　changing　their　negotiating　stance
from　the　pastI　MITI　al1ocated比ose　peop1e　who　have　more　intemationa1
background　and　who　are　critical　to　the　past　semiconductor　agreement
with　US　in　the　important　negotiating　positions　before　the　Geneva
negotiation．One　of　those　peop1e　is　the　chief　negotiator　Sakamoto．H」e，
looking　back　the　negotiation，stated　as　fo11ows：
“In　the　past，Japanese　government　unnecessary　intervened　to　the
market　mechanism　through　the　v・arious　concessions　lwith　United
Statesl　sucb　as　semiconductor　agreement，VER．in」auto㎜obi1e，and
Vo1u．皿tary　purcbasing　plan　of　auto　parts，In　this　year’sユ19951
Japan－US　auto，mobi1e　negotiation，we　took　a　strong　stance　that　we
75
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shou1d　make　such　a　negotiating　pattern－Japan　side　concede　in
fear　of　Section301－in　US　trade1egis1ationl－an　end．”73
5＿D．Stereo蚊ped．image　of　Japanese　negoti田仇rs
　　　　The　final　reason　of　US　failure　in　the　auto　negotiation　is　the　one
reIated　to　culture，9ender，and　persona1ity　type，It　is　the　stereotyping
with　whicl］US　negotiators　were　obsessed，From　the　past　experience　of
semiconductor　and1992automobi1e　negotiations，US　negotiation　mem－
bers　cou1d　mt　wipe　off　the　image　of　bowing－Japanese，
　　　　The　pro皿inent　trade　economist（and　one　of㎜y　mentors　at　Co1u血一
bia　economics　department）74Jadish　Bhagwati　pointed　to　the　prevai1ing
stereotyping　against　Japanese　as　fo11ows；
In　fact，many　of　these　cu1tura1stereotypes　are　invoked　much　too
readily　to　mark　the　Japanese　as　exotica11y　different　when，in　fact，
their　differential　beha▽ior　can　be　explained　by　differences　of
eCOnOmiC　SituatiOn．75
There　still　remains　the　way　oi　thinking　in　US　political　systein　that
harder　negotiating’stance　wi11　bring　something　out　from　Japan．
And　it　is　i帆porモant　for　Japan　side　to　negate　such　factors　in　the
future　negotiation，76
　　　　The　executive　of　Japan地｛一加物一弘舳（Japan　Business　Entities　As一
§ociation）Miyoshi　also　pointed　out　the　US　problem　of　wrong　perception
toward　Japan　and　Japanese　business．He　claims　that　US　side　did　nct
73
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75
76
Bhagwati　witb　Sakamoto（／995．p．12）．（Translated　froi皿Japanese　by　the　author．）
The馴ユthor　s亡udied　i莇tern註tional　tr盆」de説Columbia　University’s　Ph．D．program，
Bhagwati（199ユ．p．28）．
Bhagwati　with　Sak盆moto（1995，p．1ユ）．（Trallslated　from　Japanese　by　the刎ユthor．）
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seem　to　understand　the　changes　happening　in　Japan’s　business
・…鵬・t・e1ati…hip．77
　　　　Nikkei　Shimbun　Sha（1995）a1so　pointed　to　the　same　point：
77
g0一
In　the　first　ha1f　of　the　alユtomobile　negotiation，U．S．side　cou1d　not
sweep　off　the　idea　thaピーMITI　win　co皿promise　if　we　push　hard”
from　the　past　experience　especia11y　semiconductor　negotiation．
This　obsession　was　one　of　the　main　factor　that　made　the　negotia－
tion　difficult　due　to　per㏄ption　gap　between　US　and　Japan，A1so
the　obsession　made　US　side　fai1to　grasp　the　timing　of　the　intemal
change　in　MITI’s　stan㏄．78
　　　　With　a11four　reasons　above　combined，the　negotiating　stratβ野
taken　by　United　States　turned　out　to　be　wrongI　But　those　are　not　oniy
reasons　for　the　failure．Compared　with　n．on－economic　negQtiations，
negotiation　in　economic　re1ations　has　a　different　kind　of　difficu1ties　in
it、（Of　course　I　understand　there　are　a1so　different　kinds　of　difficu1ties
in　connict－reso1ution　type　negotiations－such　as　escalation，military
action，emotions　etc．）I　wi1l　explain　some　of　those　difficulties　embedded
in　the　economic　re1ations　in　the　next　section、
6．Di舶6u雌es　of　Ne馳施仇m　in　E60mmi6Re1拙ons
　　　　In　the　final　section　of　this　paper，I　want　to　conc1ude　by　stating
particular　reasons　why　econo皿ic　negotiations　can　be　difficu1t－
　　　　The　genera1problems　in　economic皿egotiations　are　in　the　difficul－
ties　in　reco．gni2ing　true　merits　of　the　parties．C◎皿pared双ith　the
internationa1　negotiations　oyer　territories，it　is　harder　to　identify　the
in－terests　to　the　countries　or　negotiators　in　the　negotiations　in　economic
77
7．8
M」iyosh1（1996，p，28）一
舳9・kei・・iShmb岨口Sh邑（！995，P圭33）一
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relations，This　difficu1ty　comes　from　both1ack　of　knowledge　of　ne－
gotiators　in　economics　and　from　the　non－zero　sum　nature　of　economic
iSS」ueS．
　　　　Firs㌧many　economicaIly　wrong　oPinions　are　prevai1in9’in　pubIic
opinions　and　policy　makers，and　thus　among　negotiators，One　of　the
most　prominent　academic　economist　Paul　Krugman（who　was　at　MIT
and　moved　to　Princeton）　expressed　this　point　in　his　！996　book
targeting　for　genera1readers　as　follows，79
They［Pop　internationalists＿people　who　ta1k　about　internation創
economy　without　knowing　basic　economicsl　al1offer　a▽iew　of　the
worId　．．．、of　internationa1trade　a　an　arena　of。．．“win－lose’’
competition　among　nations．And　they　a11contain1itt1e　or　nothing　of
what　economists　think　they　know　about　internationa1trade、
　　　　Through　participating　pub1ic　debate，Krugman　became　aware　that
“most　basic　truth　about　international　trade　had　been　dri▽en　out　of
public　discussion．”80Peop1e“might　think　they　know　a1ct　about　econom＿
i・・b・th・dn・verb・ene・p・s・dt・the・ealthi・9一”8ユM・・yp・・pl・d…t
kエiow　econom三cs．How　caIl　they　know　merits　from　trade　without
㎞owi㎎basic　internationa1trade　textbook？With㎝t㎞owi㎎the
expected　outcome，how　can　they　negotiate　over　the　issue？
　　　　A　good　example　is　VER（Voluntary　Export　Restraint）which㎜any
peop1e　consider　as　US’s　success．But　if　you　take　an　intermediate
microeconomics　course　at　any　coI1ege，82you　will　know　that　the　idea
79　Krugman（1996，p．vi…i　in　the　introduc㎡on）．
80　．Kfug皿1an（1996，P．x　in　the　introduction）
81　Krugman（1996，P．xi　in　the　introduotion）．
821teach　this　in　my　intematio血al　trade　course　at　School　of　Comerce，Wased盆
　Umversity．
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that　VER　is　good　for　US　is　wrong．VER　is　not　the　best　option　even　in
order　to　achieve　the　same（wrong）goa1．Import　restriction　can　co11ect
the　economic　rent，but　vo1un」tary　export　restraint　cannot　co1lect　such
money，It　gives　money　to　the　Japanese　automakers．This　kind　of　wrong
po1icy　is　prevai1ing　because　po1icy　makers　don’t　know　economics－
Without　havi㎎sufficient　infomation，the　negotiation　in　economic
issues　is　a　difficult　task．
　　　　Second，economic　issues　are　typica11y　non－zero　sum　types．But
most　people　have　difficulties　in　understanding　the　non－zero　sum　nature
of　the　issue．This　c1early　rela士es　to　the　point　made　in　the　first　point．As
the　negotiation　theory　encourage　people　to　seek　integrated　apProach
rather　than　distributive　approach，it　is　important，but　difficult　for
many　peop1e　to　get　away　from　the　wrong・idea　about　the“win－lose”
apProach．
　　　　Books　on　negotiation　thecry　such　as　G2材4〃gまoγE∫and　jV彦goκαξ伽
丁加oηα〃〃αc肋3emphasiz■ed　the　importance　of　mutual　gain－For
example，Jeff　Rubin　exp1ained　the　notion　of“enlightened　se1f－interest”
as“it　may　be　possib1e　for　both　to　do　wel1，”83and　Mary　Parker　Fo11ett
introduced　the　concept　of“integrated　apProach．．．．a　so1ution　has　been
found　in　which　both　desires　have　found　a　p1ace，that　neither　side　has
had　to　sacrifice　anything、”84
　　　　Difficulties　in　understanding　non－zero－sum　type　are　explained　as
fo11ows．Mary　Parker　Follett　described　the　requirement　of　th－e　integrat－
ed　apProach　as　“a　higher　order　◎f　in」tel1igence，keen　perception　an－d
disc・imi・ation、．moretha・a11，abrilli・ntimenti・eness．”85Itiseasie・to
fight　than　to　suggest　a　better　way　because，in　order　to　fight，you　don’t
haYe　to　think　Cust　react），but　in　order　to　come　up’with　better　options亘
83B噸1虹。口dR・bm（・d。，）（1991，P，4）、
84B・・s1i・・nd’Rubi皿（ed・、）（199ユ、p－！4）、
85　Bresliu　and　R」Ubin（eds〕（1991，p．16）。
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you　haマe　to　be　wise（be　proacti寸e　and　creative）、A1so，as　Bazerm．an
exp1ained　in　his　paper，h肚㎜an　has　a　fundaII1enta1bias　toward　the
fixed＿pie　assumption，86　Thus，the　most　difficu1t　part　in　the　negotia＿
tions，I　think，comes　in．this　part：negotiators’inteuigence一曲Intenigence”
includes」know1edge．It　is　important　to　k．now　that　peopIe　have　a
tendency　to　think　that　a　pie　is　fi」文ed．To　become　inven．tive，you　have　t0
know　you　should　be　inventive．But　al1those　things　are　very　difficu1t　to
achie▽e．
　　　　Thus，a11these　thi」ngs　combined，it加akes　difficult　to　seek　gcod
consequences　from　the　I1egotiations　in　economic　issues，And　I　rea／ized
that　economists　share　the　responsibi1ity　to　make　public　more“in－
te11igent．”君7
7．Condusion
　　　　In　sum，my　analysis　revea1ed　why’MITI　took　more　asserti▽e　stance
than　before　and　how　US　failed　to　capture　JapanIs　change，I　claimed　that
US　faiied　the　negotiation　for　its　own　sake，But　does　this　mean　US　lost
at　a11？Maybe　not　so，President　Clinton　won　the1996election　not　only’
because　of　the　consequence　of　negotiation　of　course，but　I　am　sure
USTR　and　President　Clinton　succeeded　in　the　fo11o」w－up　phase　when
they　expユained　the　resu1ts　to　the　press．Also，the　fact　that　Mickey
Kantor　pushed砧numerical　target”mtil　the　end　of　the　negotiation　may
have　contributed　to　a1arge　appreciation　of　YEN　in　the　su皿血er　of1995．
（froエnユ00per　do11ar　to80）This　Yen　appreciation　surely］〕elped　the　US
econo血y　and　worsened　Japanese　exporting　i正idustry．And　it　is　true　that
Japan　has　sti11been　in　recession　while　US　experienced　a　boo血in　late
1990s．
　　　　There　is　a　saying　in　Japanese：“W｛肋ωりκ伽α8θ勿，H㈱’ω0Tαf鋤
86　Breslin　aIld　Rubi血（eds．）（1991苗p．200）．
87　I　sho血Id　bear　this　i血mi皿d　beeause　I　am　teaching　ecoIlo血jcs　at　the　University、
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（Whi1e　ai1owing　the　opponent　to　cut　your　body，you　cut　into　his　bone．）”
一meaning　that　purposefu11y工ose　at　small　battles　to　achieve　win皿ing　in
the1arge　war．This1995automobile　negotiation　somewhat　looked1ike
that．If　that　is　a　case，it　is　not　a1ways　a　good　idea　to　win　in　the
negOtiatiOn．
　　　　But　I　am　sure　that　from　this　negotiation　Japan　has　achieved
something　va1uab1e　for　the　future．For　the　US　and　other　countries　in
the　wor1d　now　know　that　Japan　may　saガNo’when　it　is　needed．And　I
hope　the　resu1t　of　this　negotiation　wi11contribute　to　the　perception
amendment　in　the　US　negotiators　from　that　Japan　will　easily　give　in　at
the　last　minutes　to　maintain　the　re1ationship　to　that　Japan　is　an　equa1
partner　who　can　refuse　to　agree。
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